helped Olivier to run into debt, his companion, [illegible] had been previously [illegible]

revealed, opened to him by degrees the nature of his calling, and by a Mephistophelean argument, which is very cleverly reported in the book, induces the young man to take a first step in crime by accompanying his tempter to Calais, and helping him to ease a Belgian Count there of 100,000 francs. Olivier, previously instructed in some simple tricks, and furnished with a prepared pack, is set down to play with the Belgian. The Count loses 80,000 francs with a good grace, and then orders supper. After supper, to Olivier's astonishment, he finds that the cards no longer serve his purpose. His luck has turned, and the Count wins back his money and 100,000 francs besides, and on finding Olivier's inability to pay, denounces him as a swindler, playing with a clipped pack. Horror-stricken by remorse, and threatened with the police, the unfortunate young man signs bills for the amount, goes home and confesses to his father the dreadful tale, who pays the amount to save the family honour. Need we add that the Belgian Count was himself a "philosopher," and that he shared the 100,000 francs with the remainder of the gang? It appears, however, that these rogues were not even just to one another in the division of the spoil; for, instead of acknowledging the principle of "honour among thieves," the card-sharpers are more apt to illustrate the poet's dictum, that "when Greek joins Greek, then is the tug of war." In Chauvignac's estimation, "each gambler was classed as to his means, and also as to whether he was likely to allow himself to be plucked without remonstrance." In this case, however, it was another Greek who ran off with the money, and Chauvignac had no more than his share. This specimen will suffice to indicate the nature of the incidents described: and the moral of M. Raymond's history, of which the above is an episode, would seem to be—"We are arrant knaves all—believe none of us."

THE WEATHER-BOOK: A Manual of Practical Meteorology. By Rear-Admiral FITZROY. *Longman & Co.*

THERE is no science that has enlisted in its service so large a variety of intellect and temperament as Meteorology. It has afforded occupation to mathematicians such as Herschel and Arago; to accurate investigators of physical science, as Kaemptz and Glaisher; to scientific travellers, as Humboldt and Sabine; to aeronauts and mountaineers; to medical men, in their sanatory reports; to sailors and agriculturists, in their daily vocation; and to many, as a mere amusement. It is also served by a class of scientific men represented most prominently by Maury and Fitzroy, who are (or have been, we are sorry to interpose, in the case of the former) the heads of meteorological institutes and the organisers of other men's technical labours. Quételet of Brussels, Kreil of Vienna, Buys Ballot of Utrecht, Dove of Berlin, and Leverrier in Paris, have severally endeavoured to bring to a focus the scattered results of the the efforts of independent inquirers. Maury and Fitzroy have especially laboured in bringing the theories and observations of meteorologists to practical application in seafaring life. Admiral Fitzroy is doing excellent service in collating the broad results obtained at a reasonable number of well-selected stations, instead of frittering away the working powers of his staff on more limited inquiries, conducted with minute and useless accuracy, or, on the other hand, of vainly grappling with overwhelming masses of meteorological matter. The present desideratum in that science is to possess a rough approximate notion of the master movements of the atmosphere, from day to day during a long period, and this we can only hope to obtain by increased exertion in the path already pursued by Admiral Fitzroy. Great interest is therefore attached to his book, as being the first published record, in any other form than Parliamentary Papers or the transactions of learned societies, of the [illegible] in which he is engaged, the means he employs, and the results he has already obtained.

It is patent to all readers of newspapers that he has organised some thirty stations, whose meteorological conditions are telegraphed every morning to the Board of Trade. All these communications are examined and reduced under Admiral Fitzroy's superintendence, and are issued before noon for publication, together with his forecast of probable weather on the two succeeding days. When circumstances show a gale to be impending, or if telegrams announce its sudden and unexpected appearance, cautionary signals are at once despatched to the ports in danger. There cannot be a shadow of doubt on the advantage of knowing the weather as it actually exists. Such knowledge is in no slight degree equivalent to a theory of forecast, for if reference to the published list shows, say a general prevalence of strong easterly winds, then any locality which happens, through exceptional causes, to be experiencing weather of a different character, may reckon with some confidence on a speedy change. One large and very interesting section of Admiral Fitzroy's book is devoted to the details of the organization by which the observers at the stations are controlled, the telegraphical messages sent, and the cautionary signals displayed, together with some indications of the indomitable energy with which the Admiral devoted himself to the first institution of the department over which he now presides.

The avowed object of the volume is, however, different. It is issued as a popular exposition of the science of "weather-wisdom." It treats of the climates of the world, more especially in our latitudes, and describes the nature of the atmospheric movements and their reciprocal effects, and the grounds upon which he bases his prediction of approaching weather. It is unfortunate that the style of this important part of his book is essentially dogmatic; that is to say, he asserts the influence of various laws, but is careless of adducing the evidence by which he himself was originally induced to recognise their existence. Here is the fatally weak point of the whole of Admiral Fitzroy's reasonings. His readers are tempted to start objections *in principio*, in which case no amount of after-argument will be of any avail in carrying conviction. Again, there is a serious obstacle to the just appreciation of his views in the want of precision common to all his statements. To take a case at random, for the sake of example, he says: "Though the barometer generally falls for a southerly wind . . . . the contrary sometimes occurs, in which case the southerly wind is usually dry with fine weather." The words "generally," "sometimes" and "usually" have such vagueness of meaning that no two readers will agree in their interpretation of the passage. If he had said "when the barometer falls it indicates a southerly wind in four cases out of five: in the fifth case it is two to one that the southerly wind will be dry and the weather fine," we should have had a definite and valuable piece of information. It seems to us there cannot be the slightest difficulty in adopting this sort of numerical expression, for we are disinclined to suppose that Admiral Fitzroy, in laying down the axioms of a new science, has ventured to base his assertions on any foundation unconfirmed by the support of registers of facts. Qualificatory epithets of indeterminate force are so interwoven with all his practical axioms, that we have only observed two important and original passages in the entire book, in which he commits himself absolutely to precise statements. They are:—"Instances of fine weather with a low glass occur, however, rarely; but they are always preludes to a duration of wind or rain, or both." And again:—"The longer a change of wind or weather is foretold before it takes place, the longer the presaged weather will last; and conversely, the shorter the warning the less time whatever causes the warning, whether wind or a fall of rain or snow will continue. No data [illegible] these exceedingly superficial assertions to justify (and for our part, we venture to doubt both of them). In short, the character of Admiral Fitzroy's arguments conveys an idea, whether rightly or wrongly, that his meteorological convictions are based on no surer ground than vague observation; that without caring to fortify his impressions by a rigorous appeal to fact, he has contented himself with quasi-reasons for their justification. It is just as though a person, having acquired a belief that the changes of the moon brought changes in the weather, preferred to insist upon his belief, and to argue that it might be so, instead of searching meteorological registers for confirmation or denial of his hypothesis. There is perfectly fair ground for doubting whether much of Admiral Fitzroy's weather-wisdom rests on any better foundation than can be claimed for the popular belief in the efficacy of the moon.

In order to convey some idea of the method by which forecasts are calculated at the Board of Trade, we will analyse a hypothetical case adduced in the volume before us, which involves few axioms, and those of a class that are generally accepted. We will shortly state these before considering the problem. First, there are two, and only two, great atmospheric currents: the one from the equator to the pole, which is warm, damp, and light; and the other its exact converse. By the alternate prevalence of these at any station, and by their conflicts and combinations, all ordinary weather changes are produced. This is Dove's law, adopted by Fitzroy. Secondly, whenever a north wind has travelled far, it becomes north-easterly, for the same well-known reasons that influence the direction of the trade winds. Thirdly, when a wind, northerly in origin but north-easterly in its effect, becomes checked in its course from the north, its easterly component remains unaffected, and the wind changes to an east wind. Lastly, winds indraughted to a centre of light ascending currents, become cyclonic, or bend in retrograde curves even to the extent of forming spirals, as they approach the centre of indraught.

These being conceded, we will consider the problem. It is as follows. Suppose a steady dry cold and dense north wind affects the north of England, its density being of course shown by a high barometer, while in the south the air, which previously had a similar character, becomes rapidly warmer, damper, and lighter, and the wind becomes easterly. What does this mean? It is that a south wind is setting in, and has already begun to check the north wind, and again, that from the rapid increase in lightness, observed in the former (shown by a rapid fall of the barometer), there will probably ensue a centre of indraught somewhere to the south, as, for example, in the Bay of Biscay. As a consequence of this, the already established easterly airs in the South of England will become strengthened into an easterly gale of the cyclonic order.

When making the forecasts, each of the districts named in the usual weather reports is treated separately. The observations received from the half-dozen stations that are established in each district, are collected, and a sort of mean value is calculated, to represent the energy of the atmospheric impulses from that district. An intercomparison of all the mean values gives material for the forecast. Admiral Fitzroy looks forward to a time when some symbolical expression shall suffice to express the "potential" of each station or district. There is little doubt that a compact and readily intelligible symbolism would prove a most important help to meteorological science.

Forecasts, based on statical conditions, are far simpler matters than those we have been considering, and in the same proportion are less trustworthy. They almost wholly depend on the presumed facts of the incoming weather commencing high above head, and

upon the atmosphere possessing so large an amount of persistency that when it has been set into motion it will not readily be stopped. Whenever an atmospheric change is taking place aloft, the clouds will alter in character and in drift, and the barometer will detect the advent of a new quality of current. When the change approaches more nearly to the ground, and the surface atmosphere has been modified, though the direction of its drift may not yet be manifest, our instruments, and, indeed, our own sensations, will detect a difference of warmth and dampness. At sunrise and sunset the quality of the air far away on either side is probed and guaged by the horizontal beams of the sun, and experience has taught more than science can yet adequately explain of the connection between sky tints and weather.

It is impossible to discuss Admiral Fitzroy's data and arguments without some words in reference to the success of his forecasts. Any reader of the daily journals must see that very different opinions are expressed of their merits. It is satisfactory to know that they have been recently extended to France, where up to the present time they are said to have been decidedly successful. We should feel far greater pleasure in watching their improvement than in exposing their vagueness and their failures. We have a thorough admiration of the true British energy and perfect belief in himself with which Admiral Fitzroy pursues his work. The furtherance of the maritime interests of this country is an object worthy of an admiral who has done so much scientific service in past years; and if we freely criticise what we believe to be serious shortcomings in his theory, we not the less cordially wish him ultimate success.

EVERY MAN'S OWN LAWYER: a Handy-Book of the Principles of Law and Equity, comprising the Rights and Wrongs of Individuals, Landlord and Tenant, Master and Servant, Executors, Husband & Wife, Divorce, Bankruptcy, Mercantile and Commercial Law, Merchant Shipping, Tradesmen, Partners and Agents, Parish Law, Criminal Law, Game Laws, Fisheries, &c., Forms of Wills, Agreements, &c. By a BARRISTER. London: *Lockwood and Co.* 1863. (On cover—Price "Six-and-eightpence saved at every Consultation.")

THIS is one of a very pernicious class of books. The writer tells us in his preface that his book is "intended to give every Englishman an opportunity, at the smallest possible cost, of placing upon his book-shelves a key to the laws of his country; and, as far as can be, to enable him to dispense with legal professional assistance; which (like medical advice) is sometimes a *necessary* evil. There are questions and events," he says, "occurring in every-day life, among people of all classes, in which points of law arise, as to the legality of some step, pursuit, or transaction, which apparently cannot be decided without reference to an attorney, and such reference assuredly leads to expense; whereas most of such questions may be answered without professional assistance by first turning to the index of the present work, and then consulting the book itself at the page to which the inquirer will be referred." In other words, we are to believe that a small smattering of information respecting various points of a large subject may be made available as a practical guide.

Let this be alleged of any art, the results of which are discernible by the physical eye. What would people think of an "Every Man's own Engineer," or "Every Man's own Builder," or even "Every Man's own Cobbler"? Would not the deluded disciple of the last of these be told, with a downward glance at his own high-lows, that the maxim "*Ne Sutor*, &c.," may admit of a converse reading?

Nothing of all this seems to have occurred to the "Barrister." With an undaunted spirit he traverses the whole range of Law and its Practice. Common Law, Bankruptcy, Equity, Ecclesiastical Courts, Parish Law, are all touched upon; and the author, not content with the attractive title at the back of his book, emblazons on its sides, "Six and eightpence saved at every consultation."

Does he really believe in his device, or is he an apostle of the doctrine, "*Populus vult decipi et decipiatur?*" And would he indignantly, and in the same spirit that the Jew pedlar repudiated the imputation that his razors were intended to shave, resent any attempt on our part to fix him with an undue credulity in his own motto? We know not—but one thing is certain—books of this class will no more assist a man to clear away the legal difficulties of life, than will razors made to sell mow the stubble of a night's growth.

The best written treatise can but convey to a careful reader some general knowledge respecting the subject handled. The practical man knows that the moment he comes to deal with the facts of any particular case, be it in engineering, medicine, law, or any other art, his books always fall short of what he requires. The particular combination of circumstances, with the particular mode of treating them, is nowhere recorded, even in the most elaborate chronicles of the labours of others. How absurd, then, to suggest that what the man skilled in his art seeks in vain throughout the wide range of all that has been previously written, may be found preserved and available for the practical guidance of the multitude in the compass of a few pages!

In making these remarks we would by no means disparage the importance of legal knowledge to those who are not lawyers. It is difficult to overrate the advantages of its acquisition. Indeed, our countrymen have been said, by persons well acquainted with foreign countries, to be behindhand in this respect. It is asserted, for instance, that a Frenchman commonly knows more of his French law than his English equal in society does of the law of his own country. If the fact be so, there is a ready apology. The tide of revolution swept away in France the vast building of law, reared in various ages, compounded of various styles, and only to be understood by careful study of its history, and erected in its stead a comparatively simple edifice. An intelligent Frenchman may, for the purpose of general instruction, acquire almost all he needs to know from a pocket edition of the French Code. The Englishman who wishes to gain some knowledge of the laws of his own country must submit to a severer process. He must, if only to qualify as a well-informed gentleman, learn his law historically, tracing step by step the connection between the laws by which he is governed and the history of his country. At any rate, his education must be regarded as neglected if he has not read to useful purpose the Commentaries of Blackstone, or some other equivalent work. Nor is it possible to overrate the advantages to the general public, when a great lawyer like Lord St. Leonards descends from the bench, and attempts to instruct his fellow countrymen in the elementary principles of those branches of law with which he is thoroughly conversant. Nay, we would go even a step further. To those who have sufficient energy and ability for the task, we would especially advise a study of the branches of law which bear immediately upon their daily calling. For instance, the city man who should devote himself carefully to the study of such a book as "Smith's Mercantile Law," must assuredly have a considerable advantage over his compeers, provided, of course, his knowledge is tempered by diffidence. It is not the "little knowledge" itself of the so often misapplied quotation which is dangerous, but the mistaken confidence which it is apt to engender.

But if we turn now to the particular book mentioned at the head of this article, we must say with regret that neither in selection of subjects nor in accuracy of execution does it accomplish the task alluded to in the preface, that of "producing in a very condensed form the substance or cream of the law." As respects selection of subjects, the author has committed the grave error of including in his little book a variety of matters of an essentially technical kind, respecting which even accurate information could hardly be of any value to the general reader. We may mention as instances those portions of the book which refer to the classification of actions, to matters of procedure at law and in equity, and to purely technical matters of conveyancing. He must be truly endowed with "*Æs triplex*" who would venture to assert that upon these points any book could save the magic Half-mark, or even convey any useful information to the million.

Passing, however, to the question of accuracy of execution, as respects which we may observe that, to have been a trustworthy book, it should have been written not by a barrister, but by four or five barristers,—it must be said that, in spite of an easy and occasionally accurate treatment of some of the subjects touched upon, more especially those connected with the common law—such as Distress for Rent, Master and Servant, Governesses and Tutors (all, indeed, subjects upon which general information may with the greatest advantage be conveyed to the public), the compiler must be accused of an amount of carelessness or ignorance which sufficiently approves his wisdom in withholding his name from the title page. He has in particular sinned most grievously in respect to those very subjects of a technical character which, as we have already intimated, ought never to have appeared in the book at all.

Thus, at page 4, under the classification of actions, the quondam real actions, of *writ of right of dower*, *dower* and *quare impedit*, are treated as still subsisting, in ignorance of the enactment of the Common Law Procedure Act of 1860. At page 26 we are told ("Que diable allait-il faire dans cette galère?") that the writ of *Elegit* was established by the Statute of *Quia Emptores*;—the facts being that the writ dates from the thirteenth Edward I., and that the statute named was passed in the eighteenth year of the same reign. At p. 150, we are informed—(we ought almost to apologise for writing on so technical a subject)—that "as to women married *since* the Dower Act," the husband may bar wife's dower (amongst other modes), "5. By conveyance to uses to bar dower;" whereas the mode here mentioned is only effective in respect to women married *before* the Act. At p. 200 our "practical guide" intimates that if a legacy is given to a married woman, and her husband sues for it in the *Ecclesiastical Court*, a Court of Equity will grant an *Injunction* to stop the suit; the fact being that legacy suits in the Ecclesiastical Courts have long been obsolete. At p. 215 we are told about injunctions being divided into *Common* or *Special*, in ignorance of the assimilation of the equity practice effected some years since; and at p. 216 we have a crowning piece of ignorance in the statement that "a Bill of *Interpleader* is one filed by one of two or more persons who claim the same thing"—the truth being that it is filed by the stakeholder against conflicting claimants of the same subject-matter.

As respects, indeed, some or most of the foregoing blunders, and others of the same class, it would be difficult to say that the purchasing public of this little book are one penny the worse for them. We do, however, note errors of a graver kind, errors upon points upon which it really is desirable that the public, if informed at all, should be well informed. Thus at page 154 we read the following:—"If a man marry a woman who has bastard children he must support the children as well as the mother, for her rights and liabilities attach to him—but he is not bound to maintain her legitimate offspring by a former marriage." Whereas, so long ago as by the Poor Law Act of 1834 (see 4 and 5 William IV. cap. 76, sec. 57) the burden of maintenance of the legitimate offspring of a widow was thrown on the second husband. Again, at the same page, upon a point of some interest to persons possessed of realised property, the author (in